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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs - Case No. 14069 
MIGUEL GAXIOLA 
Defendant-Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Miguel Gaxiola, was convicted in a criminal proceeding 
of second degree murder by the court in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Miguel Gaxiola was tried and convicted by a jury of second degree 
murder. The appellant was sentenced for a term of five years to live imprisonment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by the court below 
and a new trial . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 18, 1975, a jury was impaneled and trial began before 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. The appellant, Miguel Gaxiola and 
Isaac Leyvas were charged with first degree murder by an Information alleging 
that on the 10th day of July, 1974, the defendants intentionally or knowingly caused 
the death of Lalo Idilo Trujillo, and at the time of said homicide, the said 
defendants were convicts under sentence of imprisonment, 
Miguel Gaxiola was an inmate in the California prison system prior 
to his transfer to the Utah State Prison. While incarcerated at San Quentin, 
Mr. Gaxiola was a member of a prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. (980, 
18-19) In July of 1973, Appellant sent a message to William Hankins, an 
investigator at San Quentin (979, 11-12) and expressed a desire to make a clean 
break from the mafia. (980, 18-19) Mr. Hankins testified that he realized 
that if he talked to Appellant he could not go back inside the prison, (981, 1-4) 
because if he did, he would be a Mdead man" . (982,7) Before bringing Appellant 
out from inside the walls to his office, Mr. Hankins called Don Elder, a special 
agent assigned to investigation of the Mexican Mafia, and made arrangements 
for his immediate transfer. (982,11-13) 
Donald Emerson Elder testified that Mike agreed to give the California 
authorities evidence of extreme value and that in return "we made a commitment 
to provide for his physical and psychological safety. M (987, 20-26) He also 
-2-
testified that the authorities had agreed to provide for the safety of Mr. Gaxiola's 
wife and child too. (P. 987, lines 26-30) Mr. Elder testified that Mr. Gaxiola 
had been "moved in a clandestine type of manner, he was shown on our records 
a s . . . going out to court . . . , Nobody knew where he was actually being taken, 
other than 1 and the people that transported him. " (P. 986, lines 11-16) Mr. 
Gaxiola was taken to the city jail in Monterey Park and booked under an alias 
and that they moved his wife that night "because of the communications that 
this group has and the fear that we had that somebody might move on her in 
retaliation..." (P. 988, lines 9-13) Appellant was subsequently transferred 
numerous times for his security. (P. 989, 16-17) The witness testified that 
Mr. Gaxiola "understood that when he left this group and... gave us information 
that he was certain to be killed" (990, 13-15) He testified that Mr. Gaxiola's 
life was certainly in danger (995, 2) and that this opinion is based on knowledge 
I gained through my investigation into the prison gangs and the Mexican Mafia 
and the way they operate. "When a man turns informant against one of these 
groups, expecially if he is a member, it's an automatic death contract on the 
man and whether it takes them three days to fill that contract or whether 
it takes 30 years to fill the contract when the opportunity arises that they carry 
out the kill on their man, they willcarryit out. " (P. 994, lines 11-18) Mr. Elder 
further testified that Mike was transferred with another inmate who knew of his 
situation and that there is communication between prisons within the Mexican 
Mafia. (P. 997-998) He also stated that on July 10, 1974, the date of the murder, 
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inmates at San Quenton knew that Miguel Gaxiola was in the Utah State Prison 
(998, 21-24) and that there was a death contract on Mr. Gaxiola from the Mexican 
Mafia. (999-1000) 
Miguel Gaxiola arrived at the Utah State Prison on the 5th or 6th day 
of March, 1974. (1057, 11-12) He had been assured that his name was to be 
changed and he became aware at the time of his arrival that those arrangements 
had not been made. (1058, 24-29) From the time of his arrival Appellant 
was fearful for his life. (1061, line 16, 1064, lines 26-29) Appellant related 
many incidents involving conflicts with inmates and situations that concerned him 
greatly. (1060, 1062-1063, 1064, 1065-1066) He was convinced that inmates 
would find out about him and that he would be killed (1064) either by an inmate 
who didn't like informants or by someone with the mafia contract. 
He tried to explain his situation to several members of the staff, but 
no one took him seriously, so he called the Special Agents in California* Robert 
E. Morrill, Special Agent for the city of Monterey Park testified he had several 
conversations with Appellant and that he was fearful for his life. 
(P. 10, line 14) Thomas Stroud, correctional counselor at Utah State Prison 
testified that Appellant had asked him if his records could be locked in a 
separate place and said that he felt his life might be in danger. (1026) Judith 
Shephard, psychologist and Director of the Diagnostic Unit, testified that she 
talked with Appellant several times and that he was upset, worried and fearful. 
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(P. 1042, line 1) On cross-examination, Dr. Shephard testified that it was 
her opinion that Appellant was not complaining to gain some benefit or manipulate 
the system but that "from his perception, it was real. " (P. 1044, line 14) Also, 
Richard Oldroyd, psychologist at the prison, testified that he had six to ten 
interviews with Appellant and Appellant expressed fear for his life. (976) 
The stabbing at the Utah State Prison on July 10, 1974, is a complicated 
factual situation. There were approximately 100 individuals, inmates, and 
guards who observed some protion of the incident which occurred over a pro-
longed period of time of approximately one hour and shifted from place to place 
within the institution. The State called approximately 27 witnesses and Appellant 
called 16 witnesses. It is most difficult to summarize the testimony but the 
following witness was critical. 
Joel Ammon Lindsey, correctional counselor at "B" Block at Utah State 
Prison testified that on July 10, 1974, at about 2:30 p. m. he observed " a group 
of inmates milling around and there was a lot of shouting and I saw one man 
take a swing at another one and take a kick at him. " (P. 243, lines 7-9) Mike 
Gaxiola was doing the kicking and William Pope, another inmate, was the man 
that he swung at and kicked at. (P. 243, lines 18-19) He testified that he 
called some officers to come down and assist with the situation and several 
arrived. (P. 250, lines 19-25) "And then about that time.. .Mike Gaxiola 
[came by] and he looked over at Pope and he says, 'Let's you and I go on out 
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in the yard and have this thing out.f " (P. 250, lines 19-25) Mr. Lindsey further 
testified that "Mike... walked on down [the hall] probably 30 feet... then he 
turned around and came back. And at that time he had a stick in his hand. " 
(P. 251, 2-5) "As he walked by where Pope and Lewis were standing then in the 
meantime Pope and Lewis and changed positions, Pope was standing behind 
Lewis, o. and Mike hit [Lewis] on the head with the stick. " (P. 251, lines 7-12) 
A few minutes later, Mr. Lindsey testified he "was over opening the doors. . . 
preparing to lock [the prisoners] in and I looked over on the bottom of those 
stairways, that stairway there, and I could see Lalo Trujillo standing at 
the bottom of the steps looking up the steps. [Then] I saw a broom stick come 
down the stairways. " (P. 254, lines 2-15) "I walked over and looked up the stairs 
to see what I could see out there. And I saw Mike Gaxiola standing up near 
the top of the steps. " (P. 254, lines 20-22) Mr. Lindsey then testified that the 
next thing he observed was "Mike and Lalo over here fighting" with their fists. 
(P. 256, lines 5-7) "[T]he next time I looked back I could see another inmate 
walking toward where these two were fighting. " (P. 256, lines 11-13) This 
unnamed inmate and Lalo "exchanged at least six blows. " (P. 258, lines 4-5) 
fThen... Mike Gaxiola had a knife in his hands, in his right hand, and he had 
a hold of Lalo with his left hand and he was stabbing him in the back with an 
overhand motion. " (P. 258, lines 12-16) He further testified that Mike Gaxiola 
looked like he had been crying and appeared to be upset and mad. (P. 283, lines 
6-21) 
Charles Mitchell, inmate at the Utah State Prison, testified that Pope 
was a pretty good sized man (P. 410, line 3) and that earlier in the day he 
had seen Pope hit Mike in the face. (P. 412, line 1) Mr. Mitchell testified 
that at that time Pope "had a stick and had a white cane and a little knife. " 
That Pope was pretty mad and told Mike to "Get me my shit" referring to pills. 
(P. 414-415) Mr. Mitchell further testified that Mike was "trying to get out 
of the way. " (P. 415, line 29) and that Pope followed Mike as he was backing 
up. (P. 415, lines 25-28) 
Gilbert Lee Rodriquez, inmate at the Utah State Prison who occupied 
the cell next to Mike Gaxiola, testified that he saw Mike and Pope walking toward 
"B" Block in the afternoon of July 10, 1974, and heard Mike tell Pope "Let's 
go out to the yard. " (P. 636-637) He further testified that he told "Paul 
Gardunio to go down and get the knife. " And that Paul ran down the corridor 
and came back with a knife which he gave to Mike. (P. 637 -639) He testified 
that Mike then walked toward "A" Block and then he came back and said "he 
was going to get Pope. " (P. 640, lines 18-19) Then Mike "started walking 
inside "B" Block when this Lewis was standing at the door. . . Mike still had 
this broom handle in his hand and he hit Lewis on the side of the head with 
the stick and Lewis had a belt wrapped around his hand... [w]hich he swung 
at Mike a couple or few times. " (P. 640-641) "About a minute or two [later] 
the whistle blew for ring in. " (P. 642, lines 20-21) This was a signal for all 
prisoners to return to their cells. Mr. Rodriquez testified that he walked to 
the officers cage and saw Lalo Trujillo "standing at the bottom of the stairs. " 
(P. 644, lines 3-4) That M[h]e had a dust pan in his left hand and a broomstick 
in his right hand. M (?. 544, lines 12-13) Then, Mr. Rodriquez testified, MI 
walked in around Mr. Undsey while he was talking to someone up the 
s tairs . I walked around to look up the stairs to see who he was talking to. 
I walked over by the bottom of the stairs , I walked up, took a step towards 
him, and he had the broomstick and raised it as though he was going to hit 
me with the stick . . . I seen that he was going to hit me so I hit him . . . 
I punched him with my right hand on the left side of his [face] . . . [He] 
dropped the stick and . . . we exchanged a few punches . . . Then he 
kicked me . . . in the crotch, which backed me up. At this time I seen 
Mike Gaxiola . . . at the bottom of the stairs start stabbing Trujillo two 
to three times . . . M (p. 645-647) 
Gilbert Rodriquez then testified that after Appellant left he observed 
Isaac Leyvas "squatted over Lalo and started stabbing him. ft (650) 
Robert LaSalle, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, testified that 
on the afternoon of July 10, 1974, he saw William Pope, Mr. Lewis, and Appellant 
talking in the main corridor, when out of the blue Pope hit Appellant in the 
face, (P. 857, lines 7-9) and Lewis grabbed Appellant while Pope hit him again. 
(P. 861, Lines 2-4) He testified that he left and when he returned to a different 
portion of the main corridor there was a large crowd and Lalo Trujillo 
threatened Appellant with a knife (P. 868, lines 13-16). Lalo stepped aside 
and Pope followed Appellant down the corridor as Appellant retreated. 
(872) There were subsequent altercations in the corridor. (874-878) 
He testified that he observed 
Appellant go into "B" Block and that he followed him. (878) 
When he got to the T. V. room, Mike was there and Lalo was entering 
the room. Lalo had something in his right hand and was circling toward the 
center of the room. (P. 884, lines 8-28) He testified that he saw Mike 
backing up and that Mike had a broomstick in his hand. (P. 885, line 14) He 
then left the room and ran into the officers cage. Gilbert Rodriquez was 
standing at the bottom of the stairs. "Lalo came down the steps and they started 
fighting. Well not really a fight, Lalo just -- was working Gilbert over. " (P. 
886, lines 7-12) "Mike came down the stairs a few seconds after Lalo and he 
grabbed Lalo over the shoulder... and tried to pull Lalo off of Gilbert... 
[Lalo] elbowed Mike in the side of the head throwing him off. Mike came to 
his feet and pulled a knife and attacked Lalo [while Lalo] was still beating on 
Gilbert." (886-8P7) 
Miguel Gixiola testified that on the 10th day of July, 1974, he was fearful 
for his life and that during the incident which lasted approximately one hour 
a large crowd gathered and observed and that "I didn't know who was against 
me or with me or anything. " (1071) Appellant testified that the incident 
started when Pope confronted him and said that he owed Pope 50 pills to repay 
him for $10 Pope had loaned Appellant. At that time, Pope struck him with the 
back of his hand. Someone grabbed Appellant and Pope struck him again. (1069) 
The witness stated that Pope had told him that he "knew why I was transferred 
and that I just tried to avoid it. " (1070) "He said, 'Go get your shit, I'm 
going to kill you, punk, go get your shit. ' " So Mike testified that he armed 
himself and went back to confront Pope. When he got back, Lalo was at his side 
saying " 'You are dead1 in Spanish. " (1070-71) At that point, Lalo "started 
to pull something out of his back pocket... I backed away.,f (P. 1071-72) 
The witness testified that he hit Lewis and followed he and Pope to the hospital. 
"I was wondering why Lalo was in i t . . . why he was after me. And I wanted 
to ask him why. I wanted to talk to him, I figured I could talk to him if we 
were both alone. " (P. 1072) He testified that he followed Lalo to the T. V. room 
where Lalo just came at him. (P. 1073, lines 6-13) Finally, Lalo left and 
the witness looked down the stairs and saw Gilbert Rodriquez and Lalo fighting. (107^ 
"I grabbed Lalo and I tried to pull him off.. [but] he knocked me back some way... 
I pulled out my knife and stabbed him.tT (1075) He then testified that 
A big crowd came and I just ran up the stairs. M (P. 1076) 
Dr. Louis G. Moench, physician specializing in psychiatry, testified 
that he examined Miguel Gaxiola on December 19, 1974, and based on that 
examination it was his opinion that "at the time of the alleged incident that 
Mr. Gaxiola was under extreme emotional distress and reacting to the 
s t ress ." (P. 1164, lines 18-20) He further testifed that ,T[u]sually the 
ability to reason is diminished under such circumstances. A person reacts 
with emotion more than with logic.. . I think that a person under such situations 
as extreme fear might interpret things as being. For instance, if a person is 
threatening one's life, a person doing the threatening often seems much larger 
than life, much more violent than life. Under severe fear a person may choose 
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only one or two alternatives, whereas under other conditions he might have 
a whole variety of alternatives of action. " (1164-65). Dr. Moench testified 
that the incident starting with Appellant being struck by Pope set off the 
fear for his life that had existed since his transfer to Utah. (1173) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR SEVERENCE RESULTING IN HIS BEING DENIED 
A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HIS DEFENSE WAS ANTAGONISTIC 
AND INCONSISTENT WITH THAT OF CO-DEFENDANT LEYVAS. 
Appellant made several motions to sever his trial from his co-defendant's. 
These motions were renewed throughout the trial fcp. 5, 181, 708, 1324) and 
all motions were denied by the trial court. Appellant contends that the motion 
should have been granted when initially made and that as the trial developed 
it became apparent that appellant was being prejudiced by the consolidation of 
the trials and a mistrial should have been declared. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-6 (1953) provides: 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense... 
they shall be tried jointly, unless the Court, in its discretion, 
on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any defendant orders 
separate trials. 
It is hardly necessary to examine the prudence of such a statute. As 
it was stated in Parker v. United States, P. Cir. 1968, 404 F. 2d 1193, 1196, 
• . ' . ' ' • • • •
 : i
 • . -
cert.den. 394 U.S. 1004, 89 S. Ct. 1602, 22 L. Ed. 2d 782: 
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There is a substantial public interest in this procedure. It 
expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congistion 
of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden 
upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to 
serve upon juries and avoids the necessity of recalling 
witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only 
once. 
However, State v. Turnbow, 354 P. 2d 533, 538, 67 NM 241 (I960) 
correctly holds that: 
If the decision [denying severence is] based on any concern 
for expediency or convenience of prosecution, these matters 
are subservient to the important inquiry: Whether a separate 
trial will assist or impede the proper administration of justice 
and secure to the accused the rights to a fair trial. 
U.S. v. Crane, 15 Cr. L. 2405 (7-11-74) (not on point on the facts) also 
addressed this issue stating that "whenever there is a possibility of prejudice 
to the defendant, the safest course would appear to be the traditional use of the 
severence decree. " A reading of the transcript reveals that the "safest course" 
was not followed in the present case. 
The greatest conflict between co-defendants here was centered on the 
testimony of Gilbert Rodriquez. Mr. Rodriquez was an inmate at the Utah State 
Prison on July 10, 1974, the date of the incident. As the facts presented show, 
he was present during the stabbing and a witness to the event in its entirety. 
In fact, he was the only witness who testified that he witnessed, from beginning 
to end the events of that afternoon. He was also the only witness who corroborated 
Appellant's testimony because he was present. It was essential to the defense 
of Appellant that Gilbert Rodriquez' testimony be both admitted and believed by 
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the jury. Only by a reading of that testimony can it be understood why 
severence in this case was so important. 
Gilbert Rodriquez, was a witness for the state. His testimony, 
that Appellant came to his aid as he was attacked by the victim, Lalo 
Trujillo, was not vulnerable to attack by the State since he was their witness. 
However, it was vulnerable to the attack of Mr. Barber, counsel for 
co-defendant Leyvas. It was essential to Mr. Leyvas' defense that Mr. 
Rodriquez be discredited because he was the only person who saw Mr. 
Leyvas stab Lalo Trujillo. Throughout a lengthy cross-examination, 
Mr. Barber attacked Gilbert's credibility on every issue. As if that were 
not enough, Mr. Barber's closing arguments were devastating. We would 
like to call the Court's attention to the following statements made by 
Mr. Barber during that argument: 
tT
 . . . there is real and substantial evidence . . . that Gilbert Rodriquez 
killed Lalo Trujillo . . . ,f (P. 1393, lines 14-16) That he turned State's 
evidence . . . "as an effort to save his own skin . . .ff (P. 1393, line 25) 
"Number one, Gilbert had a motive to kill Lalo Trujillo. M (P. 1394, 
lines 5-6) 
"Secondly, he had a weapon . . . (P. 1394, line 20) "Solid, tangible 
evidence that the man was armed in express conflict to his denial of that 
fact . . . " (P. 1397, lines 10-11) 
If Mr. Barber couldn't convince the jury that Mr. Rodriquez 
way lying,his client may have been found guilty. Appellant was acting in 
the heat of passion. 
He had just been threatened by the victim and found him beating on his friend 
at the bottom of the stairs. He acted out of instinct to protect Gilbert. Gilbert, 
with full knowledge of this, testified to support Appellant's testimony. Since 
Mr. Rodriquez' credibility as a witness was attacked, Appellant had to defend 
against not only the State's ''presentation of evidence but also [that] of a skilled 
defense attorney in Mr. Barber. M (708) 
It is evident from the verdict that Mr. Barber was successful in his 
attempt to impeach Gilbert Rodriquez since his client was acquitted. Gilbert 
Rodriquez was critical to Appellant's case. Because of this, Appellant was 
deprived of his right to counsel as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of the United States. The right to counsel, as it is well understood, 
encompasses the right to effective counsel and that right cannot be secured 
in the presence of antagonistic co-counsel. 
Such was the position of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Yoshino, 
439 P. 2d 666., The facts of that case were similar to the one on appeal here. 
Two defendants were tried jointly and found guilty of murdering a fellow prison 
inmate. Co-defendant !tRapanel moves for a separate trial on the ground that 
his theory of defense differed from the theory of defense of Defendant Yoshino. " 
(P. 667) The trial judge refused to grant the motion. In reversing the trial 
judge's decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii state that "a joint trial was 
prejudicial to Defendant Rapanal... The failure ot the trial judge to exercise 
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this discretion [and grant a severance] was prejudicial error. " (669) 
Appellant urges the Court to examine the evidence and grant a reversal 
in this case. Not only were the theories of defense different here, they were 
antagonistic resulting in undue prejudice to Appellant. Severance in this case 
would have caused no extraordinary burden in cost or time to the State in light 
of the manifest prejudice suffered by Appellant and the trial judge thereby 
abused his discretion in not granting a severance. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
OVERRULING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
BASED ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
During his closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following 
statements: 
. . . The deceased had nothing to do with the background of this 
defendant, had nothing to do with his existence at San Quentin, 
what existed in the mind of Mike Gaxiola was a fear, and co-
existing with that fear that by his own admission, by Hankins, 
Elder, Lassig, Morrell, the California witnesses, will exist 
the rest of his life. No one forced Mike Gaxiola to testify before 
a grand jury, no one knows his motives. He has been in prison 
one whole month at San Quentin when he turned on the mafia. He 
did it voluntarily. He brings himself to our prison voluntarily 
and now claims that because he has this background he can, with 
impunity, practically kill a man in cold blood... Are we going, 
as a society, permit every inmate at that prison to kill another 
man because he is there for his self-protection? Or are we going 
to let them attack at will and say, 'Look folks, I come to you, 
I have this terrible background, I live in fear, self-imposed 
fear, now I can shank at will? Now I can kill and at most, at the 
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very most I can be guilty of is a lessor included offense of 
manslaughter?' If that is the case, I would rather you turend him 
loose because a manslaughter conviction, in this case for Mike 
Gaxiola, is nothing. And it will give the inmates at the prison 
the exact theory, the exact feeling that I address you that they can 
kill with impunity so long as this is his background and lives in 
fear of his lifeG I don't think that is the law, I don't think that 
should be the law. (1409, lines 25-30-, P. 1410, lines 1-22) 
Attorney for appellant waited until the prosecutor had finished his 
argument and requested the Court entertain an objection to the foregoing statements. 
(Po 1320, lines 1-2) The trial court refused to hear the objection at that time 
and sent the jury to lunch and then to deliberate. (P. 1320, lines 7-26) After 
the jury had been excused, Mr. Hill made a motion for a mistrial based on 
the prejudicial effect of those comments. In the alternative Mr. Hill urged 
that the jury be "instructed by the court to disregard that statement and to 
follow the law as instructed by this court. " (P. 1421, lines 1-11) The trial 
court ruled that the objection was not timely and thus had been waived. The 
judge said that tTto bring [the jury] back over-emphasizes the point. " (P. 1421 
lines 12-23) 
The appellant urges this Court to grant a reversal based on the test 
expressed in State v. Valdez, 30 U. 2d 54, 60, 513, P. 2d 422. In Valdez, . 
the Court held that nthe test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is , did the remarks 
call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict and were they, under the circumstances 
of the particular case probably influenced by those remarks. " As the facts in this 
case show, this test has been met. 
The first prong of the Valdez test, calling "to the attnetion of the 
jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering" was violated 
by the remarks "manslaughter.. . is nothing" and the reference to future 
prison discipline. As to the first, the prosecution was urging the jury to 
disregard the court's instructions and find him guilty of first or second degree 
murder or acquit him altogether. This interpretation of the manslaughter 
provision is contrary to the law as instructed. Manslaughter is not "nothing". 
The second remark, a reference to a verdict of manslaughter giving 
'the inmates at the prison the exact theory... that they can kill with impunity," 
can only be viewed as an attempt to persuade the jurors to consider future 
prison discipline in determining their verdict. This is clearly incompetent 
evidence, and prejudiced the appellant by making his trial an example for 
all prison discord regardless of the mitigating factors presented. 
Ihe second prong of the Valdez test, that "the jury was probably influenced 
by those remarks," is evident. The jury deliberated a total of 12 and a half 
hours. After nine and a half hours t hey returned for a definition of the 
pharase "extreme mental and emotional distress. " It is obvious that the jury 
was seriously considering manslaughter as an alternative verdict. That the 
term was poorly defined, taken together with the prosecutor's clearly pre-
judicial remarks concerning such a verdict, it must be assumed that a different 
verdict may have been reached had it not been for this misconduct. The 
jury should not have been allowed to consider what a verdict of manslaughter 
would have done to the disciplinary problems at the prison. 
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The remark ''manslaughter . . . is nothingMis a misstatement of 
the law. By thus urging the jury to return a verdict of not guilty as opposed 
to a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, the prosecutor read the law not as 
written but as he needed it to convict a man of a higher offense than the 
facts indicated. This type of conduct is even more objectionable since 
the prosecutor is a '"quasi-judicial officer' and, as such, it is his duty to 
see that a person accused of a crime is afforded a fair trial. " State v. Huson, 
73 Wash 2d 660, 440 P2d 192(1968) cited favorably in State v. Walton, 486 
P2d 1118. Other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have 
adopted this same position. In Berger v. U.:S., 295 U. S. 78, 99, 55 S. Ct. 
629, 79 L Ed 1314, the court held that: 
[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, 
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, 
the two fold aim of which is that guilty shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — 
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one. 
This is specifically mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Cannon 7 of that Code, Ethical Consideration #7-13 states that "the responsibility 
of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to 
seek justice, not merely to convict. " 
The prosecution in this case made it virtually impossible for the 
jury to return a verdict of manslaughter. The comments were clearly 
prejudicial. The tr ial court ruled however that the objection to these 
remarks was not timely,\ The ruling was erroneous according to the 
procedure accepted by the trial court during the trial and case law regarding 
timeliness. 
Appellant would like this Court to consider the timing of the objection 
in light of a similar objection made earlier in the trial. Attorney for 
appellant moved for a mistrial because the defenses of the two co-defendants 
were inconsistent and their trials should be severed. The motion was made 
after Mre Barber, attorney for co-defendant Leyvas,. whose case is not 
on appeal here, had finished his opening statement. The motion was based 
on those statements. The motion was denied at that time and Mr. Hill 
requested that the record indicate that by his not objecting during argument 
of counsel, so as not to interupt, his objection would not be waived. 
The court ruled that the motion at that time was proper and timely, (p. 1810 
182.) From this type of ruling so early in the procedings it must be assumed 
that appellant relied on this and considered that his objection to the prosecutor's 
closing argument would be timely. 
Although it is a well settled principle that objections need be made 
immediately so that the trial court judge be given every opportunity to correct 
any errors commited by the court or any party, the objection here was 
certainly timely in that it was raised while the jury was still sitting and could 
have been admonished. That the court would not hear the objection and 
accompaning motion for new trial until it had excused the juiy is not a factor 
which should be decided adversly to appellant. This was the position taken in 
State v. White, 106 P2d 508. In that case, defendant failed to object to 
the prosecutor's prejudicial comments made during closing arguments but pre-
sented the issue of misconduct in a motion for new trial. In upholding that 
motion, the Supreme Court of Arizona stated at p. 510: 
"We have held repeatedly that when an appeal is taken to this Court, 
on the ground that an attorney was guilty of improper conduct in 
the course of a trial, if no objection is made by appellant in the trial 
court, the objection is waived. This, however, is required so that 
the trial court may be given an opportunity of itself correcting its 
error, and we think does not apply to a situation where a motion 
for a correction of an error is made to the court in which it was 
committed. 
In explaining the White decision , the Arizona Court in State v. Evans, 
356 P2d 1106, 88 Az. 364 (1960) stated at p. 1110: 
The last sentence of State v. White, in speaking of a motion for a 
correction of an error,T means only that an objection must be 
lodged either during the final argument of opposing counsel 
or at the completion of final argument. 
Objection here was timely in that it met the test of Evans and White 
and is within the purpose for the rule. The objection was made while the 
court could correct the problem. Since the lower court here had adopted, 
by its previous ruling the practice of entertaining objections after the 
completion of arguments, a practice accepted by the aforementioned decisions, 
its refusal to do so in this instance was extremely adverse to appellant's 
rights depriving him of a fair trial- This Court is requested to reverse 
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the trial court's ruling that it was not timely and consider the prejudicial 
effect of the statements. 
If this Court on appeal was to consider that the objection was in fact 
not timely, the right to raise the issue here on appeal should not be deemed 
waived, vtfiile the general rule is that the objection must be timely, exceptions 
have been widely accepted. One such exception is; 
11
 where the case is closely balanced and there is grave doubt of 
defendants guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as to contribute 
materially to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results requiring 
a reversal. " Pea v. Berryman, 6 Cal 2d 331, 337, 57 P2d 136. 
This is similar to the test in Valdez, and the facts indicate that the 
exception applies. There was grave doubt about appellant's guilt of second 
degree murder. The jury was obviously considering manslaughter and 
the remarks made by the prosecutor precluded this alternative. 
It should also be noted that in Valdez, no objection was made to 
the comments of the prosecutor and the issue was raised for the first time 
in a motion for mistrial. The Utah Supreme Court held that the determination 
of prejudice rests with the trial judge. By not addressing the issue of 
timeliness and resting its decision on the issue of discretion, the Supreme 
Court also recognized an exception in the test as presented in that case. 
Since it has been shown that the comment was clearly within the 
Valdez test, it should be determined that the trial court abused its discretion 
and new trial should be granted. 
Anything short of that will not only be a deprivation of protected 
rights, but will encourage similar conduct in furture cases. A case in 
point, People v. Ford, 200 P2d 867, 869, involved an appeal where the issue 
of misconduct was not raised by the appellant. The court refused to ignore 
the "'oversight" and reversed the decision on those grounds. In so ruling 
the California Supreme Court held that the reviewing court 's : 
"unpleasant duty to hold that a prosecutor has been intentionally 
guilty of prejudicial misconduct, [is] nevertheless a duty 
which the reviewing court 's must not overlook or shirk . . . 
It has always been necessary for the courts to exercise a 
restraining influence upon the conduct of over-zealous 
- prosecutors. In this they never have been, and probably 
nefcer will be, wholly successful. But of one thing we may be 
certain: it cannot be expected that misconduct, such as 
we are considering, will be discontinued or diminished as 
long as it goes unrebuked . . . It is regrettable that so 
much is left for reviewing courts in the way of discouraging 
•v misconduct. Fewer judgments would have to be reversed 
if the trial courts were more firm in controlling the compara-
tively few prosecutors who need restraint. M 870-971. 
It is apparent that this type of conduct should not and cannot 
be tolerated especially in a case where the charge is a capital offense. 
The prosecution cannot be allowed to "strike fowl blows" as the expense of 
substantial, essential, and protected rights of the accused. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON MISCONDUCT OF COUNTY AND STA TE 
OFFICIALS IN DISCOURAGING MATERIAL WITNESSES FROM TALKING 
WITH APPELLANT'S COUNSEL. 
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A motion to dismiss the information was argued before the 
Honorable James Sawaya on February 11, 1975. Witnesses were called 
by the defense and testified regarding attempts to interview several 
material witnesses who were a] legedly present or t la d i i lformation 
regarding the incident. 
CI: lester Ga ] loway , a 11 :i i n i late 1 )eiiig held it I pi rotective custody at 
the Salt Lake County Jail, refused to be interviewed by Raymond Shuey from 
the Legal Defender's office ana reported that he had been to] d not to talk 
to defense counsel although he would not disclose the source. (PP. 28-29, 
t ranscript of the hearing of the Motion to dismiss hereinafter cited as "M".) 
Mi Shuey teisfifiul liial in ,i conversation Willi Captain Hayward, ol the ,\nli 
Lake County Sheriff's office, Mr. Hayward advised Mr. Shuey "that he had 
«: i • : * ^ ' :* :• : •, - m,< r , s 'S ()( t h e L e ^ U L . 
Defender Office] : n •. MJ < ;alloway v— *-• — / 
Captain Allen testified that 1 le had """'"received instruction from [Captain 
Hayward] that attorneys defending the other inmates were not to have access 
to Mr. Galloway.ff (M. p. 44. ) / ./•••, . 
Joel Lindsey , Custody Officer at the I lh ih State I >ris< >n on i :li lty at MBU ' 
Block at the time of the stabbing refused to talk to Bruce Lubeck from the 
anyone but the Salt Lake County Sheriff1 s Office about [the incident]." : \ . 
Officer LIIKJSM ivJuscd h nliscJnur I IK s o m c e o l l)us instruction. ) 
Frank Hanchett, investigator at the Legal Defender's office, testified 
that Lieutenant Barnhard had refused to be interviewed stating that he had 
instructions from the County Attorney not to talk to representatives of Legal 
Defenders. (M. P. 66.) 
It remained impossible to determine to a certainty who was attempting 
to restrict access to the witnesses but there was every indication that Captain 
Hay ward had told Lindsey and other not to talk to counsel for defendants. 
In a memorandum decision dated February 13, 1975, Judge Sawaya 
stated that he was "frankly shocked by the attitude and spirit of non-cooperation 
demonstrated by the testimony of the witnesses called by the defendants. " 
While he denied the motion to dismiss, Judge Sawaya ordered MThe State and 
the persons charged with the prosecution of this case to cooperate fully with 
defense counsel in permitted [sic] and arranging for them to talk with and 
examine all witnesses deemed necessary and relevant by the defense. I 
would further urge that the office of the County Attorney take steps to see that 
this attitude on the part of peace officers and prison personnel be discouraged 
in the future as it certainly may become an obstacle to effective and effecient 
prosecution in the future. " 
Although a criminal prosecution is an adversary proceeding, it is 
nevertheless a search for the"factual truth" as near as that can be accom-
plished. The aforcited constitutional provisions exemplify this basic assump-
tion. Recognizing this, the courts early on recognized that a witness to a 
crime is the property of neither the prosecution nor the defense and that 
both sides must have an equal opportunity to interview all witnesses. 
State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80A. 2d 12, 15 (1910); United States v. White, 
454 F. 2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971). A corollary of this basic tenet is that when a 
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prosecutor or the police instruct a witness iM !n cooperate with a dHen'hnt 
or his counsel that the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights are 
violated. The benchmark case on this issue is Gregory v. United States, 
369 F 2c I 1 85 (D. C. C:i i 1966) cert, denied 396 U.S. 865 (1969). (Hereinafter 
cited as Gregory). 
In Gregory tt le District of Coli u i ibi a CIi a lit ( "oiii: I: of Appeals speaking 
through Judge Skelly Wright reversed the defendants conviction for five 
separate crimes including first a i id sect; t gi • «. - - '• I t le Coi lit n il eel 
that the prosecutor's advice to witnesses that thrv na ? u- to anyone unless 
he, the prosecutor, were present ,?t denied the defendant the iair trial wlik h 
"elementa 1 fain less and cit le process requires. M rhe Court noted the reason 
behind its decision as follows: 
It is true that the prosecutor stated he did not insiruci tiie 
witnesses not to talk to defense counsel. He did admit that 
he advised the witnesses not to talk to anyone unless he, the 
prosecutor, were present. 
. . . we know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the 
right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by 
effectively denying defense counsel access to the witnesses 
except in his presence. Presumably the prosecutor, in 
interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence 
of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why 
defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine, 
through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about 
the case and what they will testify to. In fact, Canon 39 of the 
Canons of Professional Ethics makes explicit the propriety of 
such conduct: t!A lawyer may properly interview any witness 
or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal 
action without the consent of opposing counsel or party.,T 
Canon 10 of the Code of Trial Conduct of the American Col1cge 
of Trial Lawyers is an almost verbatim provision. 
(360 F. 2d at 188) 
The Gregory rationale was followed in lite "unusual" case; ol Coppo-
linc> v. Helpern , 266 I<. Supp. 930 (S.D.N. Y. 1907) which presents an example 
of the fundamental character of the right involved in the instant case. Coppolino 
was a Civil Rights Action under 42 U. S. C., §1983, against the Chief Medical 
Examiner of New York City who had foreclosed the interviewing of an employee -
toxicologist by defendant's counsel in a commercial action in Florida. Defense 
counsel sought information concerning the toxicologist's examination of the 
exhumed body of the alleged victim in the Florida Homicide prosecution. The 
court granted a preliminary injunction against the medical examiner, enjoining 
him from counseling, advising, ordering, instructing, or encouraging the 
toxicologist from refusing to talk with the defense counsel. In so ruling, the 
court forcefully stated: 
. . . as to interviewing a prospective witness, our constitutional 
notions of fair play and due process dictate that defense counsel 
be free from obstruction, whether it comes from the prosecutor 
in the case or from a state official or another state acting under 
color of state law. (266 F. Supp. at 930) 
The Court noted further that when dealing with such fundamental notions 
of due process that "good faith" on the part of the prosecutor of other government 
officials "will not excuse the constitutional violation. M (266 F. Supp 936) 
And, noted a further basis for the ruling in the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constution as well as the Fifth Amendment. 
Defendant Helpern [the Medical Examiner] by his conduct has 
violated the constitutional rights of the defendant to a fair 
trial and effective counsel. The right to effective counsel 
embraces more than just the right to retain counsel. 'This 
right to employ and be represented by counsel involves a 
corollary obligation of the state not to deprive the accused 
of the effective exercise of such right, by pressing the criminal 
o £ 
proceedings either without affording him a reasonable opportunity 
to secure such counsel or without affording counsel a reasonable 
time in which to consult with his client, investigate the case, 
secure witnesses and otherwise map out the defense. (266 F. 
Supp. at 936; Citations Omitted; Emphasis Supplied). In accord 
see Johnston v. N. B. C. , Inc., 356 F. Supp. 904, 910(E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
A host of other cases support the Gregory -Coppolino position. A few 
among them are noted below. In State v. Lerner, R. I. , 308 A. 2d 324 < ll>73) 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that since under Article I, §10 of that 
state's constitution which, like Article I, §12 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, and the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, gives a criminal 
defendant the constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
tc ascertain what their testimony will be, before trial. Citing, State v. Papa, 
that it wiu constitutional error, albeit harmless i<: km* fie defendants Motion 
for Pretrial Examination of a witness who was being held in the custody of the 
state. See also Anno., Accused's Right to Interview Witnesses Held in Public 
Custody, 14 ALR 3d 652 (1967). 
In State v^ Harr, W. ! ie Supreme Court 
of West Virginia explicitly following the Gregory case found reversable error 
where as in Gregory, I he pro'icnitm}' atlorncv "appeared to have advised certain 
witnesses not to talk to defense counsel" and the trial court had denied the 
defendant's pretrial motion to compel those witnesses to talk to his counsel. 
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The court noted: 
Reason, justice, and basic fairness, not surprise, have and 
are more and more becoming to be recognized as the proper 
foundation of a trial concerning one's rights. Proper adjudication 
of such rights should be founded on a search for truth. . . In 
our judgment the prosecutor's advice [to refuse to talk to defense 
counsel] to these eyewitnesses frustrated that effort. [Preparation 
of defense] and denied appellant a fair trial. (194 S. E. 2d at 656). 
See also Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 
39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 228 (1964) and Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: 
Sporting Event or Quest For Truth, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 179. 
In California the case of Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. A pp. 
2d 134, 317 P. 2d 130 (1957) anticipated the rule in Gregory. In that case, 
on a petition for a writ of mandate to the Court of Appeals, the Court stated that 
neither side can "monopolize witnesses" since*[witnesses are not parties, 
and should not be partisans. " The court ruled that since the accused has a 
right to compulsory process, that the logical corollary to this right is "the 
right either personally or by attorney to ascertain what their testimony will be. " 
Citing State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80 A. 12, 15 (1910), the court, in 
granting the writ of mandate said: 
While the right may in certain instances be subject to proper 
exercise of judicial supervision (Baker v. State, Fla, 47 So. 2d 
728), we do not think that the prosecution or the sheriff may order 
a witness not to talk to the defendant or his counsel... of course, 
Diaz [the witness] did not have to obey the order of the sheriff 
but as a practical matter such an order can be, and was here "shown 
to be an effective way of keeping a witness' mouth closecC Since the 
order came from a person connected with the state, we are of the 
opinion that a court can and should order that person to cease 
interfering with defense counsel's right to interview a witness. 
(317 P. 2d at 134). (Emphasis supplied). In accord State v. Gress, 
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210 Kan. 850, 504 P. 2d 256, 261 (1972); i iiicl I Jnil eel States 
v. Long, 449 F. 2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971). 
The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, 
of the prosecutor In "counseling witnesses. " 
3.1(c) A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct comm-
unication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. 
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise any 
person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give 
to the defense information which lie has the right to give. 
Similarly, the Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before 
Trial, 4.1 state: • • • . . ' . 
Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not subject 
to disclosure (Section 2. 6) and protective orders (Section 4. 4), 
neither the counsel for the parties nor other prosecution oi 
defense personnel shall advise persons haveing relevant material 
or information (except the accused) to refrain from discussing 
the case with opposing counsel or showing opposing counsel any 
relevant material, nor shall they otherwise impede opposing 
counsel's investigation of the case. Cf, Code of Professional 
Responsibility, D.R, 7-109 (B)., • 
In conclusion, Appellant submits that the law is cieax m mat state 
agents may not intentionally or inadvertently indicate to witnesses that they 
should not talk to or cooperate witl: I defeiise cc3ijn.se] in his investigatioi i " • V'lii le 
the cour t o r d e r helped a l lev ia te the p rob lem, it could not cu r t the prejudic ia l effect 
of the inordinate tin le lapse bet ween tl le incident and tl le interviews 
The extent of this prejudice, as was stated in Commonwealth v. Balliro, 
20V ! J, I1, M 1.UH, IIS, Muss. I*M>,S, "is wiihm i lie realn i< >f conjecture. M 
The court held in Balliro that since it is impossible to determine what [the 
witness1] testimony might have been or what other evidence might have been 
introduced if defense counsel had had the benefit of pretrial interviews," the 
burden of showing prejudice is impossible for defendant to sustain and, 
therefore, should not be required. 
The actions of county and state agents in this case denied Appellant 
his light to a fair trial required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Appellant further contends that the 
aforementioned actions of these State Agents denied him his rights to compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses, the right to confrontation, and the right to 
effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of Utah. Appellant therefore respectfully submits that the case 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE WAS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE AS PRESENTED AND 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. 
The appellant contends that the Court erred in denying his motion for 
a new trial under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §77-38-3 (1953) which 
provides: 
When a verdict or decision has been rendered against 
a defendant the court may, upon his application, grant a new 
trial in the following cases only:... 
(6) When the verdict or decision is contrary to law or ;• 
the evidence. 
' I he standard the trial coi irt i i n 1st follow t las been set forth several 
times by this Court, In State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952) 
this Court stated 1 it 249 I » 2d 21 2: '' ' " ' ':''" . ' 
If the State's evidence is so1 inherently improbable1 as to be unworthy 
of belief, so that upon objective analysis it appears that reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was guilty, the jury's verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the 
State's evidence is such that reasonable minds could believe beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the verdict mus t 
be sustained. 
This Court said m State v, Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 764, 770 
(1949): 
The question of granting or denying a motion for a new trial is 
a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.. . This 
court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. . . We 
do not ordinarily interfere with rulings of the trial court in either 
granting or denying a motion for a new trial, and unless abuse of, 
or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial judge is 
quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge will be sustained. 
The evidence in this case does not support a verdict of second degree 
m u r d e r . y t a k Q o d e Annotated, Section 76-5-203, (1953 as amended) provides 
in pertinent part that: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree :i f, 
under circumstances not amounting to murder in the first 
degree or manslaughter the actor: (a) intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another; or (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous 
to human life that causes the death of another. 
The other two subsections under Section 76-5-203, were not charged nor 
wa s the jury instructed as to then 1. '. '• 
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Before the jury could have found Appellant guilty of second degree murder, 
they would have had to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not guilty of 
first degree murder or manslaughter. The jury was instructed as to 
Section 76-5-202 (1) (a) which provides: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if under 
circumstances not constituting manslaughter, the actor intentionally 
or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(a) The homicide was committed by a convict under sentence 
of imprisonment. 
There was no evidence produced at trial which tended to prove appellant 
was not a convict under sentence of imprisonment on July 10, 1974, the day 
of the stabbing. That is the only difference between Section 76-5-202, 
1st degree murder as charged and Section 76-5-203 (a). Since it was not 
disputed that appellant was a convict under sentence of imprisonment, 
a verdict of second degree murder under Section 76-5-203(a) cannot be sustained. 
There is also no basis for sustaining a verdict under Section 76-5-203(b) 
since all the evidence presented during the trial indicated that the brutality 
of the murder was not consistent with a finding that the actor intended only 
to cause serious bodily injury the term is defined by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 76-1-601 (1973) as amended, and reads as follows: 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ 
or creates a substantial risk of death. ". 
The autopsy report showed 10 stab wounds (p. 55ti, line 11). 
It can hardly be argued that this was an act merely dangerous to human life. 
More importantly, the prosecution failed to sustain its burden in 
proving beyond, a reasonable doubt tl lat appe] lai it a i used tl le deatt 1 of I al o 
Trujillo under circumstances not constituting manslaughter. The evidence 
produced at the trial clea rly indicates that the deatl i was caused "under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,"' and mw * 
could not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt that possibility. The 
testimony of witnesses for tl le state as well as the defense support tl: lis 
position. Appellant would call the courts attention to tl: le testimony of 
Joel Lindsey, Gilbert Rodriguez, Robert I ,aSalle, B icl lard Old royd, 
William Hankins, Donald Elder Uobm Morrill, Thomas Stroud, Judith 
Shepherd and most importantly i : Moench, the only expert offered 
fo r eitl: ler side on A/ppell ant's * i-i-> OL mind at the time of the stabbing. 
Nearly every witness called who had any direct contact with Appellant that 
afternoon testified fit lat 1\ like appeared "'upset," ott ler witnesses testified 
that Mike felt he had a good reason to be afraid for Ms life. 
"• .•
 ;
 The prosecution had made il virtually impossible for tlx 11«i 
to return a finding of manslaughter. By telling the jury he would rather 
they acquit 11: lan return such a verdict 11 le jury 1: lad to coi i lproi i lise. ' I 'hat 
was a difficult compromise in light of the fact that appellant had admitted 
to stabbing the victim under circumstances constituting self defense or 
manslaughter. The jury was confused. They i c quested definition of a 
term of art and got an unsatisfactory, dictionary definition of the words 
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which comprise that term. They deliberated for 12 1/2 hours and came back with 
a verdict which could not be supported by the law or the evidence. The court should 
have granted a new trial under Section 77 -38 -3. So we respectively submit the 
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
THE GIVING OF THE SO-CALLED "MIDNIGHT JURY INSTRUCTION" 
IN THAT IT NEITHER SERVED TO CLARIFY THE ISSUE, 
HAVING BEEN GIVEN AT SUCH AN ADVANCED STAGE OF 
DELIBERATION, NOR DID IT CORRECTLY STATE THE LAW. 
The jury began its deliberation on March 5, 1975, at 2:44 o'clock p. m . , 
(1422, 15-16). On March 6, 1975, at 12:10 o'clock a. m. , more than nine and 
one-half hours later, the jury returned for clarification on Instruction No. 27 
1-B (1426, 1-8) which read in pertinent part, "Defendant caused the death 
of Lalo Idelo Trujillo under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance and for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. " Mr. 
Merrill, the jury foreman, requested clarification of the term "extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. " (1426, 7-8) The trial court judge initially 
instructed that the jurors "use their own interpretation as to what the words. 
mean.. . the meaning [the jurors] would ordinarily give them in . . . common, 
everyday use. " (1426, 11-16) This explanation was accepted by counsel for 
both appellant and respondent and appellant contends that the Court should 
have dismissed the jury after this explanation. 
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a meeting with counsel '\o see il there [was] an additional instruction "which 
coi ild be ty ped and giw i i I '"I. ' i I IV j 1 1 1 
y (1 42:6, 26 29) 1 1 ie Coux t pre pared •' 
definitions of the individual words "extreme"', Mn lental" and "emotional" as 
defined in the dictionaiy and read Instruction No. 2 7. \, (1 429, 1 6 20) , Appellant 
excepted to the giving of this instruction on the grounds that the tei i n should 
have been considered as a whole and the instruction was inappropriately given 
.il f'lwf rime. (I4J4), I I I m • •. • • • • e .'• • ". .'•" / .•"••- -'•.-• •••'"• "••"• •  
On the basis of this exception, Appellant contends that the trial court 
eoiiiiiiiiteil prejudicial etTur' in 11n.- giving et lliiM itmU'uu.iori eaiciinj' irreparable 
injury to Appellant, The jury, in reconvening the court for clarification of the 
instruction, asked the court to instruct them as to what the term "extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance'eonstitutes (1427, 24-25) and that the giving 
of the definitions as to individual words within that term neither clarified 
term constituted. Che jury, as evidenced by the fact that they requested the clarifi -
difficulty in reaching a verdict and were considering manslaughter as a viable 
further instruction <m the grounds that it served no purpose to "further tamper 
with the jury at this stage of the game. M (142,1 , 1 8 \1 9) 
The term "extreme mental or en iotk >na 1 disturbs* n* • ;. 
- 3 5 -
It derives its definition not from the individual words which are contained in 
that term, but from usage. While Appellant does not except to the definitions 
of the individual words, the giving of these definitions served no purpose and 
judging from the verdict only served to obfuscate the meaning of the term. It 
is hard to imagine that the jury did not have a working knowledge of the 
definitions of Mextreme,T, "mental", or "emotional. " What the jury requested 
clarification on, as expressed by the foreman.(1427, 24-25) was what the term 
constituted. To define those words individually could have only confused the 
jury and this iseviienced by the verdict in that the definitions related to a term 
which was an inegral part of the lesser included offense of manslaughter and 
without a finding of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" the jury had 
to return a verdict of first or second degree homicide. While it can be argued 
that the verdict would have been the same without the giving of the midnight 
instruction, it was prejudicial error for the court to have so instructed "so 
late in the game. " The judgment should, therefore, be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, that the court below erred in not 
granting Appellant's motion for severance, motion for mistrial based on 
prosecutional misconduct and motion for dismissal based on interference 
with counsel's right to interview witnesses, that the verdict was contrary 
to the evidence, and that the court below erred in the giving of the midnight 
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jury instruction, it was prejudicial error for the court to have so instructed 
' so late in the game. " 1 he judgment should, therefore, be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. JOHN HILL 
' Attorney for Appellant 
STEPHEN R. MC CAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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